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INTRODUCTION
Humans have a flexible approach to imi-
tation. If an action has a visual goal or
is meaningful, we will “emulate” that goal
using the most familiar or comfortable
response from our existing motor reper-
toire. However, if the action is meaningless
or lacks a visual goal we will more closely
imitate the kinematic details of the action
such as its amplitude, speed, or trajec-
tory (Bekkering et al., 2000; Rumiati and
Tessari, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2005; Wild
et al., 2010). This pattern can be explained
by two theories. The goal-directed the-
ory of imitation (GOADI, Bekkering et al.,
2000; Wohlschlager et al., 2003) suggests
that during imitation, the observer cogni-
tively decomposes the observed action into
a hierarchy of goals, based on functional-
ity: the visual goal of the action (pointing
to a dot) is given more importance than
the means (which hand to point with),
causing the goal to be imitated rather than
the means. In the absence of a visual goal,
the movement itself moves up the hierar-
chy to become a primary goal and is pref-
erentially imitated. The dual-route model
of imitation (Rumiati and Tessari, 2002)
proposes that for imitation of unfamiliar
actions there is a direct mapping of the
visual information onto a motor response,
and for the imitation of known, meaning-
ful actions, there is an indirect, semantic
route which utilizes long term memory.
Both models suggest that when an action
lacks either meaning or a visual goal, imi-
tation will reflect the observed movement
more closely due to greater attention to,
and visuomotor mapping of, the move-
ment rather than the visual goal.
In contrast, autistic people do not show
this flexible approach to imitation. Autistic
children often display similar performance
to neurotypical children when imitating
actions that have a visual goal or meaning
but are less able to imitate goal-less or
meaningless actions (Rogers et al., 1996,
2010; Stone et al., 1997; Hobson and
Lee, 1999; Williams et al., 2004; Hamilton
et al., 2007a; Vanvuchelen et al., 2007;
Hobson and Hobson, 2008; Cossu et al.,
2012). We recently demonstrated a sim-
ilar pattern for the first time in autis-
tic adults (Wild et al., 2012). Participants
observed, then imitated videos of a hand
making two movements while their own
hand and eye movements were recorded.
In the goal-directed condition, the hand
moved between visual targets and in the
goal-less condition the hand made sim-
ilar size movements without any visual
targets. The hand in the video moved
at either a fast or slow speed in order
to determine whether participants mod-
ulated their imitation speed accordingly.
In line with GOADI, neurotypical par-
ticipants imitated speed changes in the
goal-less but not the goal-directed condi-
tion whereas the autistic participants used
a goal-directed approach, failing to mod-
ulate their imitation speed across con-
ditions. In addition, eye movement data
indicated that the neurotypical partici-
pants spent more time attending to the
hand, particularly during the goal-less
condition whereas the autistic participants
attended to the visual targets and hand
equally across conditions.
From the above evidence, it is appar-
ent that when successful imitation requires
attending to and using kinematics, autistic
performance is particularly affected. In the
following, I will highlight the functional
significance of this pattern by suggest-
ing that autistic people have a bias away
from observing and analysing kinematics,
which results in a significant loss of social
information. I will outline three behaviors
where attending to and imitating kine-
matics is important for social interaction
and discuss the impact for autistic peo-
ple if their ability to use kinematics is
compromised.
KINEMATICS AND PREDICTION
Observing kinematics helps us to under-
stand and predict the actions of others
(Shim and Carlton, 1997; Pozzo et al.,
2006; Graf et al., 2007; Hamilton et al.,
2007b; Aglioti et al., 2008; Ambrosini
et al., 2011; Becchio et al., 2012; Stapel
et al., 2012). For example, by observing
the initial portion of an action, people are
able to tell whether an actor is deceiv-
ing them about the weight of a lifted box
(Grézes et al., 2004) or whether a reach-to-
grasp action is performed under a coop-
erative or competitive situation (Manera
et al., 2011). Moreover, when observing
an action where there are multiple tar-
gets, we are able to use kinematic infor-
mation from the shaping of the hand
to correctly identify the appropriate tar-
get (Ambrosini et al., 2011; Paulus et al.,
2011). If autistic people do not use kine-
matic cues, one would expect them to
perform poorly on similar action predic-
tion tasks. For example, they may find it
hard judging the end point of an action or
detecting behavioral changes in other peo-
ple such as a physical illness (e.g., a motor
disability), leading to misreading of social
situations, confusion, and altered social
responses to other people. Although autis-
tic performance on action prediction tasks
requires testing, some evidence does point
to difficulties using kinematics. Boria et al.
(2009) asked participants to decide why an
action was being performed. The action
could either be congruent with the func-
tional use of the object (e.g., picking up
the receiver of a phone) or unconven-
tional (e.g., picking up the phone using
a grip suggesting the actor is intending
to move it). Autistic children performed
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worse then neurotypical controls only in
the unconventional conditions, suggesting
that they were weighting the functional
use of the object over the hand action
(see also Hammes and Langdell, 1981;
Cossu et al., 2012). Furthermore, in con-
trast to neurotypical children who imi-
tate intentional actions more frequently
then accidental actions, autistic children
were found to imitate both types equally
(D’Entremont and Yazbek, 2007). As acci-
dental actions were differentiated from
intentional actions by both a verbal
“whoops” and different (e.g., jerkier) kine-
matics this suggests that the autistic chil-
dren were unable to use these cues to
detect the intentional action.
KINEMATICS AND LEARNING
As kinematics provide knowledge about
the purpose of an action, it follows that if
we fail to comprehend the goal of an action
we can attend to, and imitate, the kine-
matics in order to more fully understand
that action. Indeed, both kinematics and
knowledge of the goal are important when
learning new actions through observation
and imitation (Hayes et al., 2007, 2008)
and imitation via the direct, visuomotor
route is more effective for learning then
the indirect route (Rumiati et al., 2009).
In addition, Williamson and Markman
(2006) demonstrated that compared to sit-
uations where there was a clear purpose
to the modeled action, children repro-
duced the action more faithfully if there
was no clear reason for the model to per-
form that action. Consequently, if obser-
vational learning relies to some extent
on direct visuomotor mapping one might
expect that learning novel actions would
be harder for autistic people. It is possi-
ble that they would learn better by doing
it themselves first in order to acquire the
motor representation and perhaps rely
more on proprioceptive rather than visual
information to learn (Haswell et al., 2009).
Little work has examined how well-autistic
people learn via observation and imita-
tion, but it was recently observed that
compared to neurotypicals, autistic chil-
dren required additional demonstration
and practice to learn how to retrieve a
prize from a custom built box (Nadel
et al., 2011). However, more experiments
are required to fully test this form of
learning, particularly using tasks where
success depends on learning kinematics
(e.g., retrieving the prize required a certain
movement speed or trajectory).
KINEMATICS AND SOCIAL RESPONSE
Observing kinematics allows us to pre-
dict other people’s actions, but also pro-
vides information about how to respond
to others—e.g., whether we should imi-
tate to learn, play or “fit in.” This social
function of imitation is apparent in situ-
ations where children and adults imitate
unnecessary or unusual actions (Gergely
et al., 2002; Whiten et al., 2009; McGuigan
et al., 2011). For example, when asked
to retrieve a reward from a box, partic-
ipants imitate causally irrelevant actions
that clearly have no impact on the success
of retrieving the reward (McGuigan et al.,
2011). However, when there is an appar-
ent reason for the irrelevant action (e.g., an
accident), infants are more likely to imitate
only the goal (Meltzoff, 1995; Carpenter
et al., 1998; D’Entremont and Yazbek,
2007). It has been suggested that this form
of imitation serves a social role, providing
a shared experience and a way to con-
form and align oneself with ones cultural
group (McGuigan et al., 2011; Nielsen and
Blank, 2011; Simpson and Riggs, 2011).
Depending on the context, we may inter-
pret the unusual kinematics of an action as
an invitation to join and share the expe-
rience (Rogers et al., 2010) to learn or to
conform. I suggest that this behavior stems
from a comparison between the (known)
goal and the unusual kinematics of the
action, resulting in a prediction error and
alerting the observer to paymore attention
to the action. Importantly, kinematics sig-
nal that the action requires re-evaluation
and that it may be appropriate to imitate
the action more closely to play, learn, or
conform. In line with a failure to use this
kinematic information, autistic, compared
to neurotypical children are less likely to
imitate actions that do not have a clear
function or are incidental to achieving
the outcome (Hobson and Hobson, 2008;
Rogers et al., 2010; although see Nielsen
et al., 2012). We also found a similar pat-
tern in adults carrying out imitation of
hand movements when the observed hand
made a curved movement instead of mov-
ing straight to the end location (Wild et al.,
2012). Neurotypical adults imitated the
curved trajectory in both the presence and
absence of visual goals, whereas the autistic
adults only imitated the trajectory in the
absence of goals. These results suggest that
in the presence of a clear visual goal, neu-
rotypical participants place significance on
the unusual movement trajectory by ana-
lyzing the kinematics and changing imita-
tion strategy, whereas the autistic partici-
pants weighted the visual goal.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have highlighted how the pattern of imi-
tation impairments in autism can provide
a key to understanding autistic behav-
ior. Autistic individuals have greater diffi-
culty imitating actions that require close
observation and visuomotor mapping of
kinematics, suggesting that they are fail-
ing to use kinematics to predict, learn,
or respond appropriately. Consequently,
they are missing out on a rich source
of social information. Future work is
required to directly test how autistic indi-
viduals perform action prediction and
observational learning tasks in order to
advance this theory. It is also impor-
tant to find out why autistic individuals
are less inclined to use kinematic infor-
mation. Although a number of studies
have found that motor difficulties cannot
solely account for imitation impairments
(Rogers et al., 1996, 2003, 2010; Dewey
et al., 2007; Vanvuchelen et al., 2007; Wild
et al., 2012) it is arguable that observ-
ing and imitating kinematics places par-
ticular demands on visuomotor control
(Press and Heyes, 2008; Rumiati et al.,
2009). As biological motion is dynamic
and fast it may be relatively more challeng-
ing for autistic people to integrate visual
with motor signals, compared with stan-
dard motor test batteries that often require
self-generated movements. Alternatively,
our previous eye tracking results suggest
a reduction in attention toward the kine-
matics in favor of the goal, potentially
due to altered top down control (Wild
et al., 2012). Importantly, this does not
imply a reduction of general attention
to the task (Press et al., 2010), but a
specific bias away from the kinematics.
Altered attention is consistent with theo-
ries proposing that autistic people fail to
attend to social stimuli because they do
not experience feelings of social reward
(Dawson et al., 2004; Chevallier et al.,
2012). Consequently, autistic individuals
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may feel little motivation to attend to
and imitate the kinematics, which contain
socially relevant information. Whether the
failure to use kinematics is due to visuo-
motor impairment or altered attention is
important as it affects how we may design
future training therapies. It will be critical
to test whether training can enable autistic
people to successfully attend to and imi-
tate kinematics and whether this results in
improvements in prediction, learning, and
social response.
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